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Discovery Reform Redux

CARL TOBIAS

0

The recent resolve of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules to
revisit reform of the discovery rules, which the Supreme Court revised as
recently as 1993, is replete with ironies. In August, 1998, that Committee,
which has primary responsibility for studying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and developing suggestions for their improvement, published
proposals that would significantly revise the substantial 1993 revisions of
the discovery rules.1 Ironies suffuse many specific aspects of the rule revision process and of the proposals to revise the 1993 revisions less than five
years after their implementation. I emphasize the proposal to revise mandatory automatic disclosure, which requires that litigants exchange important information before formal discovery. This procedure has been
controversial, although several other proposed revisions would significantly change discovery and are similarly ironic.
I. THE RULE REVISION PROCESS

Numerous ironies attend the nascent phase of the protracted rule revision process that will be the second major test of the rule revision procedures that Congress instituted a decade ago. For example, the rule revisors
clearly ignored the astute admonitions of two former Advisory Committee
reporters, additional distinguished legal scholars and experienced practitioners that most rule revisions require a generation of practical application before their efficacy can be judged fairly.2 The rule revisors corre-

* Professor ofLaw, William S. Boyd School ofLaw, Unh'erslly ofNe-.·ada, Las Jegas. I wish to
thank Mary Berkheiser and Peggy Sanner for l aluable suggestions and Eleanor Davison for proc0

essing this piece. Errors that remain are mine.
I. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 18 (1998) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].
2. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Obsen·atlons Concerning CM/ Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 52-53 (1967) (citing Benjamin Kaplan's view of generation time period for analyzing rules);
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spondingly disregarded the remonstrations of a growing chorus of critics
who have urged that rule revision occur less frequently and have even
called for moratoria on revision and procedural change.3 Indeed, if the
proposed discovery revisions traverse the extensive rule revision gauntlet
and become effective, they would constitute the fourth important package
of discovery revisions since 1980.
At least, the Advisory Committee apparently remembered the earlier,
unfortunate experiences with the 1983 revision of Rule 11, which required
that judges sanction lawyers and litigants who failed to conduct reasonable
pre-filing inquiries, and the 1993 revision of Rule 26(a)(l), which imposed
automatic disclosure. Rule 11 's 1983 revision became the most controversial change in the Federal Rules' half-century history, thus necessitating its
fundamental revision in 1993. Rule 26(a)(l)'s proposed revision had been
the most controversial formal proposal ever to revise the Rules. Significant reasons why these provisions proved so troubling were that the rule
revisors had collected no empirical data on Rule 11 's operation before
revamping it in 1983,4 while they had minimal empirical information regarding automatic disclosure and little experience with the procedure's
practical application when the revisors proposed to impose disclosure.s
This time, Judge Paul Niemeyer, Chair of the Advisory Committee,
appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to investigate the need for revisions
in the discovery rules. 6 That group concomitantly commissioned studies
of discovery by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), an important research
arm of the federal courts, and the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil
Justice (RAND), an expert independent research entity that had recently
completed an unprecedented analysis of procedures for reducing expense
and delay in civil litigation under the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of

Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REY. 664, 677 (1979) (providing Miller's similar view).
3. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call/or a Moratorium, S9 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 8S4-SS (1993); John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the
Process ofRevising the Federal Rules, SS MONT. L. REV. 434 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The Exam·
pie of Rule ll, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 192S, 1930 (1989); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4SS, 4SS-S9 (1993).
S. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure In Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27
GA. L. REV. l, 17-18 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory J'lformal Dis·
coveryand the Politics of Rulemaking, 69N.C. L. REV. 79S, 813-21 (1991).
6. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Allee·
marie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 24, 2S (1998) [herein·
after Niemeyer Memorandum]; Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery
Rules Really in Need ofAmendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. Sl7, S21 (1998) [hereinafter Niemeyer, Here
We Go Again].
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1990.7 Although the Committee had minimal understanding of how several major proposed revisions would in fact operate because the measures
had received little actual application, the Advisory Committee ultimately
premised the proposals for revision substantially on these studies, which
included considerable empirical data.
II. SPECIFIC PROPOSED REVISIONS

A. Automatic Disclosure
Numerous, specific proposals to revise the 1993 discovery revisions
are ironic. Illustrative is the proposed change in automatic disclosure.
The Advisory Committee principally based its determination to propose
revision of Federal Rule 26(a) on two perceptions.' One was that the proposal that eventually became the 1993 amendment requiring automatic
disclosure had been the most controversial proposal to revise the Federal
Rules in 60 years. For example, practically all segments of the organized
bar vociferously opposed the proposed disclosure amendment. They believed that it would impose an additional, unnecessary layer of discovery,
substantially undermine the traditional adversary system, create certain
ethical dilemmas, such as conflicting obligations of counsel to the court
and to clients; and leave unclear precisely what information must be revealed, and thus lead to unnecessarily expensive satellite litigation over
the proposed revision's meaning.9
The second perception was that Rule 26(a)'s provision for all ninetyfour federal districts by local rule, judges by order in specific cases, and
litigants by consent to opt out of the compulsory disclosure requirements,
complicated federal civil practice by facilitating the application of inconsistent disclosure strictures. 1° For instance, one-third of the courts rejected
disclosure altogether, another third eschewed the federal disclosure rule
and adopted their own local disclosure measures, and one-third subscribed

7. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Managemenl: Furlher Analysis of lhe Civil Jusllce
Reform Acl Evalualion Data, 39 B.C. L REv. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging ct nl., An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Praclice Under lhe 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L
REv. 525 (1998).
8. See Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6-7.
9. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 5, at 28-32; Carl Tobias, Improving lhe 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1612 (1994); Amendments to Fcdernl Rules or Civil
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 512 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. The 1993 discovery revisions in Rule 26(b)(2) included similnr opt-out provisions for the
number or depositions and interrogatories and the length or depositions.
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to the Federal Rule. 11
The two perceptions on which the Advisory Committee primarily
premised the decision to propose revision of Federal Rule 26(a) may actuM
ally have been misperceptions, however. The realities, apparently, are that
the 1993 disclosure amendment has proved considerably less controverM
sial, particularly by operating more effectively, than many critics preM
dieted, while the revision has fostered the application of fewer conflicting
local disclosure measures and promoted less balkanization than some fedM
eral courts observers anticipated. These actualities are manifested in the
findings of the recent Federal Judicial Center and RAND Corporation
studies of discovery that the Advisory Committee commissioned.
The Committee requested that the Federal Judicial Center evaluate
discovery's expense. The Center received responses from 1200 of the
2000 attorneys whom it surveyed, and this information enabled the FJC to
reach numerous conclusions respecting the 1993 disclosure revision. 12 The
Center determined that disclosure was being broadly employed and was
apparently having the effects that the Advisory Committee intended. 13 For
example, "[t]ar more attorneys reported that initial disclosure decreased
litigation expense, time from filing to disposition, the amount of discovM
ery, and the number of discovery disputes than said it increased them." 14
The FJC also found that "many more attorneys said initial disclosure inM
creased overall procedural fairness, the fairness of the case outcome, and
the prospects of settlement than said it decreased them." 15 Multivariate
analyses which employed docket data confirmed lawyers' perceptions
regarding reductions in time from filing to resolution, but did not support
their views that disclosure decreased litigation expense, while ''[r]elatively
few attorneys reported that disclosure requirements led to motions to comM
pet, motions for sanctions, or other satellite litigation." 16 However, thirtyM
seven percent of attorneys who had experience with disclosure identified

11. See DONNA STJENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (Mar. 30, 1998), reprinted In 182 F.R.D.
304 (1998). Inconsistency's problems were exacerbated when the federal disclosure revision became
effective on the same 1993 date that the CJRA required 50 districts to issue civil justice expense and

delay reduction plans. Only the last minute failure to strike a satisfactory compromise precluded
passage of a statute which would have prevented that federal revision from taking effect. Because
numerous districts had seemingly not planned for the provision to become effective, this created much
additional confusion. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 1613-14.
12. See Willging et al., supra note 7; Niemeyer, Here We Go Again, supra note 6, at 521.
13. See Willging et al., supra note 7, at 534-35.
14. Id. at 535.
15. Id.

16. Id.
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one or multiple difficulties with the procedur~. 17
Ironically, the RAND study yielded somewhat different results. The
Committee commissioned the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to review a
broad database that RAND had assembled in conducting the major CJRA
study and additionally assess this information in ascertaining how well
discovery functions and how it could be improved. 11 The earlier study
proved inconclusive because RAND selected sample cases before revised
Rule 26(a)(l) became effective. 19 The follow-up examination determined
that disclosure minimally affected cost and delay. For example, RAND's
data and evaluations did not "support strongly the policy of mandatory
early disclosure as a means of significantly reducing lawyer work hours
and thereby reducing the costs of litigation, or as a means of reducing time
to disposition.''2° RAND concomitantly observed that "[f]indings from a
recent survey of about 1000 attorneys by the ABA's Litigation Section"
resembled the RAND determinations: 21 "Analysis of the survey results
suggests that Rule 26(a)(l) disclosure has not had a significant impact on
federal civil litigation. . . . The survey provided no evidence that ... disclosure had reduced discovery costs or delays" or that it had decreased
conflict between adversaries in the discovery process.21 Finally, "[d]espite
the dire warnings of critics of early mandatory disclosure, [RAND] did not
find any explosion of ancillary litigation and motion practice related to
disclosure ... .''23
As to the second perception respecting the application of inconsistent
discovery requirements, the FJC claimed that an "increasing number of
voices among both the bench and the bar have asserted that nonuniformity in the discovery rules-and in the disclosure rules in particular-is a serious problem and should be resolved.''24 The Center found that
sixty percent of the lawyers polled think that the adoption of conflicting
disclosure procedures across districts creates difficulties.25 Ironically, only
sixteen percent characterize the complications as serious,26 while a mere
six percent believe that intra-district inconsistency fosters serious difficul17. Seeid.
18. See Kakalik et al., supra note 7; Niemeyer, Here We Go Again, supra note 6, at 522.
19. See Kakalik et al., supra note 7, at 628; JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OFTIIE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 37-39 (1996).
20. Kakalik et al., supra note 7, at 678.
21. Id. at 679.
22. Id. (quoting KA1lfLEEN L. BLANER ET AL., AMERICAN BAR AssoctATION, MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE SURVEY: FEDERAL RULE 26(A)(l) AFTER ONE YEAR (1996)).
23. Id. at 658; see also supra notes 9 & 16 and accompanying tcxL
24. Willging et al., supra note 7, at 541.
25. Seeid.at542,583.
26. See id. at 583.
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ties, and nearly three quarters "think non-uniformity within a district is not
a problem."27
The substance of Rule 26(a)(l)'s proposed revision substantially revises the 1993 disclosure revision, which mandates that a party reveal information which is "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity."28
The new proposal would require that a litigant disclose only material
which favors its position.29 The proposed revision, thus, would narrow,
and perhaps eviscerate, the 1993 disclosure strictures by demanding the
exchange of less information.30
A threshold irony is why the Advisory Committee chose to propose
this revision today. After all, the FJC and RAND studies indicate that the
I 993 disclosure amendment has operated efficaciously. Insofar as the
1993 revision has seemed to work poorly, several phenomena could explain this apparent ineffectiveness. There may simply be too little experience with the provision or insufficient evaluation of disclosure's application to posit definitive conclusions regarding efficacy, while early criticism of the device might have colored its subsequent implementation.
Additional experimentation with multiple formulations of the procedure
may correspondingly enhance appreciation and even lead to the discovery
of a clearly superior disclosure mechanism. Ironically, the rule revisors
seemed less concerned about proposing the most effective measure than
about placating disclosure's critics by diluting the 1993 revision. Even
were the current need for change clearer, it is uncertain that the new formulation would actually be an improvement. The proposed revision substitutes wording that might prove ambiguous for terminology that has acquired rather definite meaning.
Judges concomitantly understand, and are accustomed to applying,
this phraseology, while lawyers and litigants comprehend, and are used to
complying with the language. The new articulation could also foster considerable satellite litigation over its meaning and disclosure's scope,
thereby imposing cost and delay. The rule revisors ironically suggested
that the proposed revision apply in all cases, although the RAND and FJC
studies found disclosure to be most problematic in relatively few, complex
lawsuits.
The Advisory Committee, therefore, appeared ambivalent about auto<?

27. Id. at 583-84.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B) (1998); see Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 57-SS
(Proposed Amendment in Rule 26(a)(I)).
29. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 57-58 (Proposed Amendment in Ruic 26(a)(I)).
30. The proposed revision would at least reduce incentives to plead with particularity, thereby
honoring the Federal Rules' notice pleading regime. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
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matic disclosure.J 1 The Committee seemingly conceded that judges and
lawyers have not subscribed to the regime instituted by Rule 26(a)(l)'s
1993 revision and that disclosure has effected little change in discovery,
even as the Committee appeared unwilling to jettison the idea and attempted to preserve it in a less objectionable fonn.32 Indeed, Judge
Niemeyer candidly acknowledged that the
beginning was a strong disclosure rule that could be, and was, defeated by local option. The next step is a diluted disclosure rule
that cannot be defeated by local option. Perhaps in several more
years the time will come for a strong disclosure rule that cannot be
defeated by local option.3J
Ironically, attorneys appear equally unclear about whether disclosure
warrants change today, and if so, how. For example, the FJC found that
lawyers consider judicial case management the most promising way to
decrease discovery difficulties, although eighty-three percent want modifications in the discovery provisions themselves.34 Forty-one percent of
those polled favor a "unifonn national rule requiring initial disclosure in
every district," but twenty-seven percent desire a national rule imposing
no disclosure and prohibiting local disclosure provisions while thirty percent prefer the status quo.JS Thirty-three percent of respondents want disclosure to be made unifonn now; however, twenty-seven percent think that
revision should await greater experience with the 1993 disclosure amendment.36

B. Other Major Proposed Revisions
Several additional major .changes that the Advisory Committee suggested implicate similar ironies. Perhaps most important and illustrative is
a proposal that involves the scope of discovery.37 For many years, parties
have been able to secure infonnation that was "relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action.ms The proposed revision would
narrow the scope of discovery to material that is "relevant to the claim or
31. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Obstacles in the Search/or Truth; Proposed Amendn:ents to thz
Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure Hinder Discow!ry in Ways Unnecessary and Unjust, LECiAL nMES,
July 27, 1998, at21.
32. See id.; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (listing the factors that vinunlly nil
segments of the organized bar found objectionable about the 1993 disclosure nmendment).
33. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 6, al 7.
34. See Willging el al., supra note 7, at 543.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 592.
37. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 64-67 (Proposed Amendment in Ruic 26(b)(I)).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I).
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defense,"39 while litigants could only acquire information relevant to the
subject matter upon motion and a showing of good cause.40 The proposal's
ostensible purposes are to restrict discovery and preclude fishing expeditions by limiting parties to the discovery of matters raised in the pleadings.
As with disclosure, an initial irony is why the Advisory Committee
decided to recommend this change now. For instance, the FJC and RAND
evaluations suggest that discovery is generally working well and that the
I 993 revisions have been efficacious, particularly by limiting considerable
contentiousness which attended discovery without prejudicing litigants'
rights to secure necessary discovery. To the extent that overbroad discovery apparently is a serious problem, judges currently have numerous
mechanisms for restricting discovery's scope.41 Even were change obviously warranted today, the new proposal might not constitute improvement. For example, it is unclear that the proposed alteration will actually
limit the amount of discovery. The proposal would correspondingly replace the "subject matter" standard that is familiar to judges, lawyers, and
litigants and that has a relatively clear meaning with a new criterion which
could produce much satellite litigation over its interpretation and discovery's breadth, thus increasing expense and delay. Another irony is that the
proposed measure would apply to all lawsuits, even though the recent FJC
and RAND studies indicate that overbroad 'discovery principally occurs in
a rather small number of complicated cases.
The proposal might also erode the notion of general pleading that has
prevailed since the I938 adoption of the initial Federal Rules. For instance, the proposed "claim or defense" stricture may require that plaintiffs attempt to draft specific pleadings before they can secure material that
is under defendants' control that would now be available through discovery. The "claim or defense" language could lead plaintiffs to include in
pleadings broader assertions than the material that they possess supports to
secure greater discovery, thereby exposing plaintiffs to motions to dismiss
and motions for Rule I I sanctions.42
39. Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 64 (Proposed Amendment in Rule 26(b)(I)).
40. See id. at 64-65 (Proposed Amendment in Rule 26(b)(l)).
41. As with disclosure, any apparent inefficacy may be attributable to Insufficient experience
with, or evaluation of, the relevant discovery revisions, while additional experimentation may In·
crease understanding or prompt discovery of better approaches.
42. These possible effects on notice pleading ironically differ from that which the disclosure
proposal may have. See supra note 30. Similar ironies attend proposed imposition of presumptive
limitations on depositions to one day or seven hours. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 83
(Proposed Amendment in Rule 30(d)(2)). For example, there is a threshold question of whether this
modification is necessary. Insofar as deposition length is a problem, courts can now respond under
Rule 30 or by tailoring temporal restrictions to specific cases' needs in pretrial conferences, while the
proposal applies to all cases, even though limitations may only be necessary in relatively few.
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Another similarly ironic proposal involves the notion of cost bearing,
whereby judges may allow discovery that is disproportionate to a case's
needs only if the requesting litigant pays for the information sought'° The
proposed revision might simply be unnecessary, especially given the substantial authority which courts currently have over discovery practice.
This proposal is also ironic because it reverses the long-standing premise
underlying discovery in the American adversary system that parties have
similar access to proof. The present scheme makes information either
discoverable or not, an issue which judges ultimately resolve. The proposed revision favors those who possess documents by reducing the party
that wants information to the undesirable choice of having less material
than it needs or sustaining potentially large search expenses. The proposal
concomitantly disadvantages resource-poor litigants while creating perverse incentives for parties with economic or political power.'" Finally,
even if the proposal were formulated to treat the rather rare situations involving discovery abuse45 or document-intensive cases, the proposed revision applies to all lawsuits.
III. ADDITIONAL IRONIC IMPLICATIONS

Additional ironies would accompany implementation of the new discovery proposals. If the proposed rule revisions survive the protracted
rule revision gauntlet and take effect, the proposals both alone and synergistically could upset the delicate balance between plaintiffs and defendants that is carefully struck by the Advisory Committee in the 1993 revisions. For instance, the proposed changes would narrow the permissible
scope of discovery and impose search costs on plaintiffs. The balance
would be altered, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary by Judge
Niemeyer that the Committee assiduously labored to maintain this balance.46
The introduction of new, untested mandates might also require that
lawyers and litigants file additional papers, that they and judges participate
in more hearings and conferences, and that judicial officers resolve greater
numbers of discovery disputes. The imposition of different discovery
43. See Proposed Amendments, supra note I, at 87·89 (Proposed Amendment in Rule 34(b)).
44. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 495-98 (1988189).
45. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Mylh of Pen·asive DlscO\'l!ry Abuse: The Sequel, 39
B.C. L. REv. 683 (1998) (discussing discovery abuse and rule revisions in light of empirical studies);
see also Jack Weinstein, Whal Discovery Abuse?: A Commenl on John Se/ear's "The Barris/er and
the Bomb," 69 B.U. L. REV. 649 (1989) (considering different types of discovery nbuse nnd possible
solutions).
46. See Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 6, at 4; see also Cavanagh, supra note 31, at 21-22.
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mandates and criteria will concomitantly demand that judges comprehend,
apply, and refine, and that attorneys and litigants discover, understand, and
conform to the new concepts. These requirements will additionally complicate federal civil practice by expanding the already enormous quantity
of procedures that counsel and parties must find, apprehend, and satisfy.47
The measures include provisions in Title 28 of the United States Code and
substantive statutes, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in local
procedures which all ninety-four district courts apply. Those local strictures encompass a growing number of local rules that differ from the Federal Rules and Acts of Congress, some of which districts adopted under
the Civil Justice Reform Act, as well as a plethora of local requirements,
such as standing, scheduling, and minute orders, individual-judge procedures· and informal unwritten practices that apply in every court.
If the proposed rule revisions become effective, the modifications
would constitute the fourth major set of discovery revisions in the last two
decades. Their addition to the stunning array of procedures that now govern federal civil practice may have several detrimental consequences. This
development would require once again that federal judges master and enforce, and federal court practitioners and litigants find, understand, and
comply with discovery revisions and may trigger another prolonged period
of inconsistent judicial application, satellite litigation, and uncertainty. It
would concurrently exacerbate systemic overload while additionally test. ing, and perhaps exhausting, the tolerance of the bench, bar, and litigants
for procedural change. The proposed discovery alterations could further
fragment the already fractured condition of modem federal civil procedure. Finally, most of the phenomena described above would increase
expense and delay, thus directly contravening Congress's clearly expressed intent in the CJRA to reduce cost and delay.48
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the consummate irony is that neither the ironies witnessed in
the recent rule revision process nor in the proposed discovery revisions are
novel. This rule revision roundelay simply serves as another trenchant
testament to procedure's cyclical character and as a reminder that the rule
revisors, American proceduralists, and others interested in reforming the
rules, as tinkerers, are destined to. "repeat the cycle of revision and relapse
47. 1 rely in the remainder of this paragraph on Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformat/on In
Procedural Justice, 11 MINN. L. REV. 375, 379 (1992); Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure
for the Twenty-First Century (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994); Tobias, supra note 9, at 1601-04.
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again and again.' 049 Indeed, the specter of the rule revisors tinkering with
the discovery rules for the fourth time in less than twenty years assumes a
surreal quality and renders even more prescient Justice Lewis Powell's
explanation for his opposition to the modest 1980 discovery revisions:
"Congress's acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the
adoption of genuinely effective reforms.''50
The recent rule revision experience correspondingly reaffirms the
aphorism that the "history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural reforms,"51
although the measure of a generation has been radically truncated. Of
course, if the rule revisors "cannot know what the result of any given
change will be,"52 it is not surprising that they needed to revisit the 1993
discovery revisions so soon. At least, the revisors apparently learned
from, and attempted to correct, certain of their predecessors' mistakes.
After all, the Advisory Committee commissioned several studies before
recommending revision of the 1993 discovery revisions. Moreover, the
proposed elimination of opt-out provisions in those revisions would help
restore uniformity and ameliorate the balkanization that the strictures created. This omission would concomitantly enable the rule revisors to refurbish their tarnished reputation or perhaps regain some of the respect
that they lost by evidencing insufficient commitment to the protection and
preservation of a national procedure code.53 In the final analysis, procedural progress may be ephemeral or at best incremental, frequently advancing two steps and losing one or moving laterally and even falling
back.54
49. Marcus, supra note 30, at 494.
50. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 1000 (1980) (Powell, J..
dissenting); see also Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 WIS. L. REY. 236 (discussing issues
raised by Rule 11 revision).
51. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REY. 837, 1030 (1984); see also supra note 2 and nc:c:ompanying text.
52. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences ofModern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 631, 677; see also Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. Pm. L. REY. 801 (1995)
(response to Stephen Yeazell's piece; evaluating modem process and mnking suggestions for trcming
changes).
53. See Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: Jn Search ofa 77:eory for
Optional Rules, 14 REY. LmG. 49 (1994) (discussing the Advisoiy Committee's inndcqunte protection of a national c:ode). But see Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our
Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994) (defending to some extent the process for promulgating rules and asking for the support of the bar). Even if issuance of the recent proposed revisions
only reflects an effort by the revisers to justify their continued cxistenc:e, it would nt least suggest that
the revisers are human and subject to the foibles of other bureauc:rntic, entrenched institutions. See
Mullenix, supra note 45, at 689.
54. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: 77:e Prospects/or Proeedural Pro~. 59
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 812-23 (1993).

